Why Won’t Healthcare Workers Take The Swine Flu Vaccine?

by Rachel Friedman

Can vaccinations actually fuel pandemics? According to a study released August 26, 2009 by the British Medical Journal, more than half of Hong Kong’s healthcare workers surveyed said they would refuse the H1N1 shot, which is not yet available, because they are afraid of side effects and doubt how safe and effective it will be.

More importantly, the study suggested the trend would be repeated worldwide.

“The truth is that vaccines aren’t effective, generally carry dangerous side effects, and in many cases actually fuel the spread of pandemics,” said Dr. Leonard Horowitz, a Harvard University trained medical researcher who also holds a Master’s Degree in Public Health. “The fact is that most healthcare workers know this, and they don’t trust that any swine flu vaccine will do anything but cause more problems and potential harm to the patients they care for.”

In Dr. Horowitz’s view, vaccines do more harm than good, and are little more than a way for the pharmaceutical companies to profit from epidemics and side effects.

“In April, 2009, the swine flu scare placed the world at high alert thanks to gads of suspicious publicity,” Dr. Horowitz said. “Anglo-American officials and Reuters News Service first claimed this was a rapidly spreading combination of the world’s scariest flu’s – swine, avian and Spanish flu viruses. They were all said to be rolled up in this never-before-seen Mexican pathogen.”

The scare, however, seemed to have less substance than volume, as the thousands of U.S. deaths that were predicted never happened, Dr. Horowitz added.

“The H1N1 swine flu shot is more of a drug than a vaccine given the list of toxic chemical ingredients causing side effects including Guillain-Barre syndrome, a deadly paralyzing disorder widespread after the 1976 swine flu vaccination campaign.” Dr. Horowitz continued.

“Vaccines are an aberration, and the medical profession and pharmaceutical companies have been playing fast and loose with explaining how vaccines immunize people,” he said. “Classic immunology draws an important distinction between the terms ‘immunize’ and ‘vaccinate.’ By casually substituting ‘immunization’ for ‘vaccination,’ the pharmaceutical machine mystifies the masses. More accurately, vaccinations cause hyper-sensitizations.

Simply put white blood cell body guards begin to attack far more than desired. Myriad auto-immune diseases and childhood injuries result from vaccinations. However, pseudo-scientists and ignorant health officials confuse this matter with the ‘immunization’ misnomer. Similarly, they repeat the myth that vaccines, not improvements in hygiene and nutrition, caused the great reduction, or alleged elimination, of deadly human diseases.”


These people should know what they are talking about!


Swine Flu

From 1970 to 1974, I was a member of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) Infectious Disease Advisory Committee. Several times a year, we reviewed various protocols for evaluating vaccines, including influenza, that were conducted in the vaccine evaluation units then supported by NIAID. We were kept abreast of the efforts to match the influenza virus strains incorporated into the vaccines with the anticipated wild strains that would circulate in the coming season.

In the first months of 1976, mere weeks after I had become director of NIAID, influenza broke out at Fort Dix, New Jersey. Several soldiers died, and soon the Center for Disease Control (CDC) and other agencies determined that the cause was a swine flu virus (H1N1), thought to be a direct descendant of the virus that caused the pandemic of 1918. This conclusion was based on antibodies to H1N1 antigens found in survivors of the 1918 pandemic, and the belief that the 1918 virus was eventually transmitted to pigs in the Midwest, where it persisted and caused sporadic human cases. Had the virus broken out of the pigsty, so to speak, and caused the outbreak in humans at Fort Dix?

Approximately 200 young men were infected in January and February, as detected by conversion of serial sera from negative to positive for swine flu hemagglutinins. This finding was reported by Frank Top to the AFEB. With the exception of 1 or 2 deaths, the disease was reported to be mild.

Sometime in February 1976 a group of intramural and extramural influenza experts reached a near consensus that the Fort Dix swine flu was likely to be the source of an imminent pandemic of influenza, perhaps similar to the pandemic of 1918, because Fort Dix virus had the antigenic characteristics of what was thought to be the 1918 virus. One notable exception to this consensus thought it possible but unlikely that the Fort Dix outbreak would be the origin of a pandemic. He noted that an influenza epidemic began like a cloudburst in the population in which it first makes its appearance, for example, in a cluster of schoolchildren, as was the case with Asian flu in 1958.

Predictably, meetings of the experts were called, and a general sense of alarm prevailed, as well as a sense that something must be done to prevent an epidemic that might be a replay of 1918. All agreed that we needed to enhance national and worldwide surveillance to determine the extent of a possible major outbreak of this virus, but other courses of action were more hotly debated. Flu vaccines became available in 1944, and the primary question facing us was whether we should quickly prepare a vaccine with the Fort Dix swine flu virus strain and immunize as much of the population as possible.

In January, and for the next 10 months, David Sencer, director of CDC, frequently consulted with Harry Meyer, director of the Bureau of Biologics, and myself. Also involved in the discussions were Theodore Cooper, assistant secretary for the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare; Hope Hopps, Bureau of Biologics; Walter Dowdle, chief of the virology section at CDC; and John Seal, deputy director of NIAID. William Jordan and John LaMontagne later joined the NIAID circle. Maurice Hilleman of Merck frequently joined an informal group for intense discussions on clinical trials that were conducted in the spring of 1976 with the vaccines that had been quickly prepared by the industry.

Throughout the spring and summer, we monitored carefully for swine flu elsewhere in the world, particularly in the Southern Hemisphere, where it was winter. We received only scattered reports of an occasional case of swine flu in farmers in the Midwest, and controversy raged as to what the next steps should be. Should the vaccine be stockpiled? The argument against stockpiling was strong: the vaccine had to be given before the potential epidemic occurred in September and October, and we were racing against time. Initially, Albert Sabin insisted the vaccine should be given to children when school began in September 1976. Yet some experts preferred a “wait and see” approach.

After much consultation and discussion at the highest levels of the US government, the Public Health Service launched a program to immunize 50 million people. Following the largest voluntary mass vaccination campaign since the mass vaccination programs with Salk and Sabin polio vaccines, nearly 25% of the US population, or 45 million persons, were vaccinated by October, 10 short months after the alarm was sounded.

The epidemic, however, did not occur. The Fort Dix outbreak was a false alarm, and the American public and much of the scientific community accused us of overreacting. As someone noted, 1976 was the first time we had been blamed for an epidemic that did not take place.

Donald Burke and his group at the Johns Hopkins School of Public Health have recently calculated the basic reproductive rate (R0) of the 1976 virus. On the basis of available historical data, they calculate an R0 of 1.1–1.2. This number suggests that swine flu would not have become a major epidemic. We did not have those calculations at the time, nor were such calculations widely used. At least R0 was >1 and not <1.

These efforts to prevent an epidemic were, in some ways, like a big “fire drill.” We proved it was possible to organize a mass influenza immunization program from start to finish: identify the virus, grow up stocks, prepare and field test the vaccine, provide for indemnity, and immunize a large segment of the population, all within 10 months. We learned a great deal from that drill, and I am sure we can do better the next time. The day will come when we will again retrace this race against time.



Its not like the US Government does not have a history of using thier population as guinea pigs.

Better to be a human being with the flu ,than a lab rat or guinea pig with unexpected side effects.


“From the Archives: Radio Public Service Announcements ~ The Swine Flu Epidemic of 1975-76.”

This is a recording session held with Jimmy the Greek to produce a series of public service announcements promoting widespread vaccination in anticipation of a wide-spread outbreak of Swine Flu in the winter of 1975-76. The PSAs were produced by the Centers for Disease Control, which spearheaded a massive inoculation campaign. No swine flu epidemic came, and unfortunately the vaccine proved to be worse than the disease. Thousands experienced serious side effects, and nearly 100 people died. The government’s aggressive initiative ended in an embarrasing public health fiasco. This recording comes from the Records of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 1921 – 1995, National Archives (NARA II).



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